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Abstract
An increasing number of oil market experts argue that OPEC members substan-
tially overstate their oil reserves. While the economic implications could be dire, the
incentives for overreporting remain unclear. This paper analyzes these incentives,
showing that oil exporters may overreport to raise expected future supply, thereby
discouraging oil-substituting R&D and improving their own future market conditions.
In general, however, overreporting is not costless: it must be backed by observable
actions and therefore induces losses through supply distortions. Surprisingly, these
distortions oﬀset others that arise when suppliers internalize the buyers’ motives for
R&D. In this case, overreporting is rational, credible, and cheap.
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1 Introduction
The recent hike of crude oil prices has revived old fears about energy security. In addition
to political and geological imponderability, a small but growing number of market pundits
points out that deliberate overreporting of OPEC’s crude oil reserves is one, possibly dra-
matic, source of uncertainty.1 Thus, Bentley (2002) observes that "Saudi Arabia and Iran
may well have signicantly smaller reserves than listed" in their statistics. The Econo-
mist (2006) reports warnings that suppliers as "Kuwait might have only half of the [...] oil
reserves" they oﬃcially report. The Energy Watch Group, a Germany-based think tank,
claims that when applying "the same criteria which are common practice with western
companies, ...[Saudi Arabia’s] statement of proven reserves should be devalued by 50%"
(EWG (2007)). Consequently, the privately funded UK Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil
& Energy Security reckons that "the world’s supposedly proved reserves of 1,200 billion
barrels are probably overstated by at least 300 bn barrels" (ITPOES (2008)). The Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) expresses doubts "about the reliability of oﬃcial MENA
[Middle Eastern and North African] reserves estimates, which have not been audited by in-
dependent auditors" for decades (IEA (2005)) and The Wall Street Journal (2008) reports
that "[f]uture crude oil supplies could be far tighter than previously thought."
These quotes combine to the following picture: opaque national oil companies hold private
information on major parts of world crude oil reserves, the amount of which they grossly
overreport to the rest of the world. Yet, while the economic consequences of such a
scenario would be dire, the actual motives of overreporting remain unclear.2 To the
economist, unfamiliar with the technical details of oil markets but trained to handle
rational expectations, the following type of questions occurs: Why would oil suppliers
overreport their reserves? After all, shouldn’t they rather underreport reserves, since
anticipated shortages raise current prices? Under which conditions can misreporting in
general be credible and are these conditions likely to hold?
The present paper addresses these questions. It shows that in an ordinary setting of
exhaustible resources, incentives to overreport emerge naturally through the following
mechanism. Oil importers rationally decide to engage in resource-saving R&D whenever
expected future supply of conventional oil is suﬃciently low. Oil-exporters, in turn, over-
report their reserves to raise expectations of future oil supply, discourage resource-saving
R&D and thereby improve their future market conditions.
1Many denitions of crude oil reserves exist. Quotations refer to the standard denitions proven and
proven and probable reserves (conventional crude oil in place with 90% and 50% probability, respectively).
2It is sometimes argued that OPEC members overreport reserves to increase their allotted production
quotas, which are based on reserves. Indeed , after OPEC’s quota system was established in 1983, members
increased their reported oil reserves (see Campbell and Laherrèr (1998) and Bentley (2002)). Market
observers as the IEA or the EIA did not simply substract the reported increases and the question remains
whether OPEC can manipulate expected future supply and the market’s reactions to it.
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The two assumptions underlying this mechanism are common in the literature of ex-
haustible resource: rst, technological change is the outcome of directed and costly R&D;
this assumption implies that high expected future oil supply depresses resource-saving
R&D. Second, oil supply is not competitive, so that oil suppliers internalize the impact of
their supply on the market conditions and can actively manipulate them.
The paper frames the argument with a signaling game — a standard and suitable tool
to analyze information rents. On the one side, an oil-supplier holds private information
about the realization of its total stock of reserves and decides how to allocate it between
two periods. An oil-consumer, on the other side, decides whether or not to invest in
time- and resource-intensive oil-substituting R&D. Now, the oil-supplier can be said to
misreport credibly (over- or underreport) if (i) observable current supply — the signal — is
uninformative about its "type", i.e., the remaining reserves and if (ii) the resulting pooling
equilibrium generates higher benets than the respective full information equilibrium. By
this denition, misreporting and benecial pooling are one and the same thing.
Credibility requires that overreporting be backed by observable actions, and therefore is,
in general, costly. More precisely, observable contemporaneous supply must correspond
to the pretended amount of reserves and hence does not coincide with supply under full
information. This requirement generates a cost of overreporting, which generally limit the
supplier’s willingness to overreport.
The analysis shows, however, that the cost of overreporting can be negligible and indeed
even negative for a wide parameter range. The intuition for this surprising result is the
following. Regardless of information asymmetries, the key problem of the oil-supplier
is how to allocate the resource over time. In the absence of technological change, it is
dynamically optimal to smooth supply across periods. Under the threat of resource-saving
R&D, however, the smooth supply rule is no longer optimal but the supplier decreases
current and increases future supply to discourage oil-substituting R&D. This eﬀect is
present under full information. Now, overreporting under private information generally
requires an increase of current supply and hence brings the overreporting country closer
to its unconstrained optimal — the smooth supply rule. Consequently, the distortions from
overreporting eliminate the earlier distortions due to technological change, in which case
the costs of overreporting can be said to be negative.
Two specic features of the model require a word of explanation. First, a two country
setup is adopted. This feature allows for utility losses of the oil exporting country, whose
population may suﬀer from self-generated disruptions in global oil supply. Abstracting
from these costs (e.g., by assuming that a monopolist maximizes net present value of
prots) would bias the model in favor of the nal result, i.e., the existence of credible
overreporting. Second, the oil-exporter is allowed to levy export taxes. This assumption
is necessary since the importer benets from substitution R&D mainly through a reduction
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Figure 1: Oil Price and Expenditure on Energy R&D∗
of the exporter’s market power. The analysis must therefore involve the prime tool through
which the exporter exercises market power in the foreign market. This tool is an export
tax.
The paper predicts that oil exporters tend to overreport if, rst, substitution R&D reacts
signicantly to expected future oil supply, second, if oil supply is not competitive and
nally, if the costs of overreporting are limited. As argued above, the last requirement
is no meaningful qualitative criterion since theory does not establish a positive lower
bound on the cost of signaling. Hence, the attention rests on preconditions one and
two. Concerning the rst, empirical work shows that substitution R&D has indeed been
responsive to oil prices (see Newell et al (1999) and Popp (2002)). Figure 1 illustrates this
relation in a suggestive way by jointly plotting the time-series of total R&D expenditure
on non-oil energy sources in IEA member countries and crude oil prices for the years
1973-2006.3 Concerning the second requirement, the proposition of non-competitive oil
markets seems intriguing. Indeed, while empirical evidence on OPEC’s eﬀective market
power is mixed, some recent studies argue that OPEC members successfully sacriced
supply following the counter oil shock of 1986 (e.g. Smith (2003)). In this case, a rst
qualitatively application of the model cannot refute that OPEC member states overreport
their crude oil reserves and further quantitative research is needed to quantitatively assess
the issue.
The paper connects to the literature on the economics of exhaustible resources. Since its
3Expected future prices strongly comove with contemporaneous prices (see Lynch (2002)). The expected
future price, in turn, is the key statistic for R&D expenditure according to this paper’s argument.
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very foundation by Hotelling (1931), a good part of this literature analyzes the eﬀects of
monopolistic market power. Following the oil shocks of the 1970s this research intensied
(see Stiglitz (1976) and Pindyck (1978)), extending to cartel formation, both theoretically
(Salant (1976), Ulph and Folie (1980), and Gaudet and Moreaux (1990)) as well as em-
pirically (e.g. Griﬃn (1985), for recent contributions see Smith (2003), Almoguera and
Herrera (2007), Lin (2007), and the references therein). About the same time Dasgupta
and Heal (1974) sparked a line of research concerned with the substitution of exhaustible
resources, either via exploration (see Burt and Cummings (1970), Arrow and Chang (1982)
and Quyen (1988)) or directed technical change for substitution (e.g., Davidson (1978)
and Deshmukh and Pliska (1983)). The present paper’s mechanism results from the in-
teraction of both key elements of the above-mentioned literature — monopolistic supply
and substitution eﬀorts.
Only a small number of papers analyze asymmetric information about resource reserves.
Thus, Gaudet et al (1995) and Osmundsen (1998) show that rms have incentives to
underreport reserves: given that extraction costs are higher for lower reserves, underre-
porting of reserves means overreporting of costs, which, nally, saves taxes on prots. A
recent study by Gerlagh and Liski (2007) analyzes how asymmetric information about re-
source reserves impacts the consumers’ decision to invest in substitution technologies. In
a rich dynamic setting, the authors focus on buyer’s exposure to endogenous uncertainty
of supply. The present paper, in contrast, emphasizes the seller’s incentive and potential
to conceal or to signal its type.
Finally, the present paper contributes to the ample literature on signaling games. It en-
capsulates a standard framework à la Spence (1973) in a two-period general equilibrium
trade model. Recent extensions of the classical two-stage setup analyze signaling in an
innite horizon setup. Thus, Kaya (2009) studies separating equilibria in an innitely
repeated signaling game, where each period the informed player plays against a diﬀerent
uninformed player, the latter having observed previous signals. Gryglewicz (2009), in-
stead, analyzes the endogenous revelation of types in a stochastic, continuous-time game
between one informed and one uninformed player. Such a setup seems indeed promising
to frame the case of continued oil supply under asymmetric information. The interaction
between the signals (initial supply) and the nal payoﬀ (distribution of supply over time),
however, causes analytical diﬃculties that make this route excessively complicated. Hence
my choice to resort to a two-period setup.
Before turning to the main body of the paper it seems appropriate to contemplate what
insights one can expect to obtain when applying a signaling model to the oil market.
On the one hand, one can reasonably expect to refute overreporting — e.g., if the costs
of signaling due to supply distortions exceed the benets. On the other hand, it will
be impossible to actually prove overreporting: if the model revealed actions that consti-
tute unmistakable indicators of overreporting, the concept of a pooling equilibrium would
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be violated, making overreporting non-credible. Disproving overreporting might work;
attempts to actually prove overreporting must fail.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model economy,
describes the economic agents and the space of their actions, thus describing the game.
Sections 3 and 4 solve the strategic game under full information and under asymmetric
information, respectively, and discuss the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 General Setup
The world economy consists of two countries: country O (like the Oil-exporter, variables
marked with ∗) and country W (like the Western or Weakly-informed country, no ∗). Both
countries are populated by individuals of mass one and engage in cross-border trade in
two consumption goods within each of two periods,  = 12. After the second period the
world ends. The periods are meant to represent long time intervals, dened by the time
it takes to develop a technology with which to substitute the natural resource.4
Production. In  = 12, country W produces  units of a perishable consumption good
 . Country O is endowed with a grand total of ∗ units of a second consumption good
, which represents a natural resource. The mining costs of  are negligible, but once 




¯  with probability 
 ¯  with probability 1 − 
(1)
where  ∈ (01).
The model’s setup is common knowledge, but realization of ∗ is known to country O
only, which supplies ∗
 units in  = 12 under the constraints ∗
 ≥ 0 and ∗
1 + ∗
2 ≤ ∗.













4Lovins et al (2005) reckon that US oil demand projected for 2025 can be cut to half by the use of
substitutes and energy-saving technologies. In this sense, periods are "long".
5This assumption reects prohibitive storage costs. In the case of oil production, the storage cost are
substantial, impeding storage of quantities needed to cover supply for the "long" periods.
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where  ≥ 0 are consumed quantities of good  =  at time  = 12. The sub-utility
takes the form
() = ln( + 1) +  (3)
The convenient choice of this sub-utility has expositional reasons. First, quasi-linearity
implies that income is transferable across periods, so that country W’s (country O’s)
trade-oﬀ between the cost and the benets of R&D (of overreporting) simplies.6 The
logarithmic specication ensures that export taxes are bounded and have explicit analytic
solutions; the additive term in the argument grants niteness of export taxes.7
Government policies. Central authorities, or governments, act strategically. For sim-
plicity "the strategy of country X’s government" will simply be referred to as "country
X’s strategy." In this sense, country O supplies ∗
 in periods  = 12. In addition, country
O sets gross export taxes ∗
 .
Country W’s decides whether to develop a substitution technology.8 More precisely, coun-
try W may incur   0 units of good  in period  = 1 to develop a constant returns to
scale technology that becomes available in period  = 2 and enables country  to convert
good  into a perfect substitute of good  with the marginal rate of transformation
  1. Country ’s substitution technology can be summarized by
1 = 0 and 2 =
(
0 if 1 = 0
 if 1 = 
(4)
The output generated by this technology will be denoted by 2 and one can write
 = 
For a convenient notation let country W’s rst period output and second periods invest-
ment be denoted by 1 = 0 and 2 = 0, respectively.
Substitution R&D has two key characteristics. First, it is dened as a binary process
(4), so that engagement in R&D is either zero or big time. This assumption is common
to the literature (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Deshmukh and Pliska (1983),
Quyen (1988), and Barrett (2006)) and shall reect a major technological breakthrough
in substitution technologies. Further below I argue that this rst feature is not crucial.
Second, there is the time-lag between R&D expenditure and availability of the substitution
technology. This assumption captures the fact that major technological innovations need
6Income is transferable if 
(∗)
  0 holds, which will be the case throughout the paper.
7The additive term in the argument can be read as a ow of a perishable substitute to the natural
resource in each country.
8It will become clear that part of the return to substitution R&D is not appropriable so that substitution
R&D must be centralized (or centrally subsidized), the costs are nanced by lump-sum taxes.
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Figure 2: Timing of actions.
time to be developed and to become applicable9. This second assumption is crucial to
the paper’s mechanism, as the argument relies on the fact that technological progress
cannot be generated instantaneously. Clearly, if technologies became operable at the
time of investment, R&D decisions would be delayed until uncertainty is resolved and
information rents would vanish.
Timing. The timing of actions, summarized in Figure 2, is the following. at  = 0
nature chooses the realization of ∗, which is revealed to country O only. At the start
of period  = 1 country O supplies the quantity ∗
1 and sets the export tax ∗
1. Country
W subsequently chooses the investment 1 and rst-period consumption is realized. At
 = 2, country O sets export taxes ∗
2, supplies ∗
2 ≤ ∗ − ∗
1 and the second period’s
equilibrium quantities are consumed.
Notice that country W chooses its strategy 1 after 1 and 1 are set. This assumption
implies that country W can condition its strategy 1 on 1 and on 1. If 1, 1, and
1 were taken simultaneously, country O’s overreporting via observable actions could not
inuence country W’s strategies and would thus be irrelevant for the equilibrium. The
signaling game has no strategic content if the receiver of the signal cannot condition her
actions on the observed signal.
Intuitively, country W’s substitution R&D harms country O by generating competition of
-supply in period  = 2. To avoid such losses, country O may use its supply and private
information, to discourage R&D activity. The costs and benets from doing so are central
to the following analysis.
2.2 Consumers’ Optimization
At  = 12 consumers maximize sub-utilities (3) subject to the respective budgets con-
straints ∗
 + ≤  and ∗
+∗
 ≤ ∗
 , where the price of  has been normalized
9Lovins et al (2005) reckon that US oil demand projected for 2025 can be cut to half by when beginning
to adopt substitutes and energy-saving technologies 20 years in advance.
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to unity,  is the price of good  and 
(∗)
 is respective net per capita income. Con-
sumers take domestic prices and the quantities ∗
 and  as given. Provided that interior
solutions prevail (
(∗)
  0 for  = ), optimal quantities are
 = 1(∗
 ) − 1  =  − 1 + ∗
 
∗
 = 1 − 1 ∗
 = ∗
 − 1 + 
When the -market clears (i.e.,  + ∗
 = ∗




¯  + 2
(5)
With this expression of the price, country W’s expenditure on consumption goods equals
the value of its production in domestic prices minus the value of inputs for R&D plus
-production, i.e.
 =  + 
∗
 + 1





Country O’s revenue from the export tax (∗
 −1)(∗
 −∗
) is distributed lump-sum so
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These expressions lead to equilibrium consumption
 =
¯  + 2
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(7)
The optimal policies (∗
, ∗, and 1) maximize the sum of the sub-utilities (7).
2.3 Optimal Export Tax
Both countries use their policies to maximize the respective total utilities (2), which
involves an intertemporal trade-oﬀ between periods. Equation (7), however, shows that
the rst period’s export tax ∗
1 aﬀects neither the cost of country W’s R&D nor its
returns, which accrue in the second period only. Hence, 1 is independent of ∗
1 and so is
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∗
2. Also, when ∗
2 is set in  = 2 all rst-period variables are taken as given, so that ∗
2
is independent of ∗
2. Hence, the optimal export taxes ∗
 maximizes the sub-utilities ∗
.
No substitution technology. In case  = 0, country W is not capable of -production,
 = 0 holds trivially and maximization of ∗





 − 12 (8)
Substitution technology. If, in contrast, 2 =  holds, the price ratio ∗
22 cannot
exceed the marginal rate of transformation 1 and country O’s equilibrium export tax
must satisfy the constraint ∗
22 ≤ 1. When this constraint binds, expression (5) yields
∗
2 =
¯ 2 + 2

− 1 (9)
Equation (9) implies that any increase of the export tax ∗




induces an increase in 2 that keeps the relative price ∗
22 constant. With (7) it is
straight forward to check that, under (9) and at constant ∗
2, sub-utility ∗
2 is decreasing
in 2 if and only if ∗
2 ≥ 1 or, equivalently, ¯ 2 ≥ 2( − 1) holds. Consequently, under
condition 2 = , country O’s optimal export tax is ∗
2 = max{(∗
2 + 2) − 11} and


















if  = 
(10)
Equation (10) has been derived assuming that the constraint ∗
22 ≤ 1 binds. With
(5) and (8), this is the case if ∗
2|=0  , or if  is large compared to country O’s second
period’s supply:
2 +  − 2  ∗
2 (11)
In that case, equilibrium consumption (6) of both countries depends on country W’s
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while under 2 =  equations (6) and (10) lead to




2 − 1} ∗
2 = ( − 1 − 2)
10Notice that (5) and (8) imply 
∗
   1 so that consumed quantities 
(∗)
 from (6) are positive.
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Combining both cases, sub-utilities (7) are
 =
(
ln() + 2 − −1

















2 + 1}) + −1−2
















Together, equations (10) and (13) determine the equilibrium utility for given supply ∗

and investment 1 and imply the following observations.
First, the sub-utility ∗
 is increasing in ∗
, hence the resource constraint ∗
1 + ∗
2 ≤ ∗
binds and the second period’s supply equals the residual ∗
2 = ∗ − ∗
1. This is a simple
verication of Walras’ Law.
Second, conditional on  = 0 (i.e. 1 = 0), ∗














Thus, conditional on country W not investing in R&D, country O’s total utility (2) is
maximized when the natural resource is supplied evenly across the periods
∗
1 = ∗
2 = ∗2 (15)
This supply rule is a degenerate version of Hotelling’s optimal rule, which states that
— correcting for time preference rates — optimal supply is smooth. Any deviation from
optimal supply rules can directly or indirectly be attributed to substitution R&D activity.
Third, combining equations (11) and (15) shows that the possibility to engage in R&D
aﬀects world prices if and only if
2 +  − 2  ∗2 (16)
holds. Intuitively, technology  can aﬀect the price of  only if either the substitution
technology is very eﬃcient ( is large) or country O’s endowment ∗ is small. For the
rest of the paper condition (2) will be assumed to hold.
Finally, if country O’s supply in the second period is large enough (∗
2  2(−1)), country
W does not produce the substitute (2 = 0) even under 2 = . In this case country W’s
return to R&D consists of a reduction of import prices ∗
22 in the second period. The
returns to costly R&D are positive but non-appropriable, wherefore substitution R&D
must be centrally nanced in country W (compare footnote 8).
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3 Full Information
This section provides a benchmark by analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the sequential
game, assuming that the amount of total reserves ∗ is common knowledge. It has been
shown that all strategic interaction can be reduced to a two-stage game in which country
O rst chooses ∗
1 and then country W decides on 1. Export tax and consumption choices
follow from static optimization. The game is solved by backward induction.
2 stage: Optimal Investment 1. Country W does not engage in substitution R&D
if and only if the net gains fall short of the costs (2|2=−2|2=0 ≤ ). With expressions
























Country W’s optimal strategy is thus expressed by the rule
1 =
(
0 if (17) holds
 else
The trade-oﬀ between costs and benets of substitution R&D are trivial if the cost  is
prohibitive even under minimal (zero) supply of  in the second period. To rule out this
case, assume that (17) is violated under ∗




− 1   (18)
1 stage: Optimal Supply ∗
1. In the rst stage country O may either prevent country
W’s substitution R&D or, alternatively, concede to it. If it prevents substitution R&D, ∗
2
must satisfy condition (17). Since the term on the left of (17) is decreasing in ∗
2, condition
(17) implicitly denes a lower bound on ∗
2, labeled ∗
 and satisfying (17) with equality.
Noticing that the expression on the left of (17) is negative whenever ∗
2  2+−2, one
has, by assumption (18)
∗
 ∈ (02 +  − 2) (19)
By concavity of ∗ (see (14)), country O’s optimal supply, conditional on 1 = 0, is
∗
1 = min{∗ − ∗
∗2} (20)
Intuitively country O can prevent substitution R&D by supplying enough of  in the
second period so that it does not pay for W to develop the substitution technology.
11The expression on the left of (18) is positive by   1.
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Clearly, whenever total resources ∗ are large (i.e., ∗  2∗
 holds), country O is not
constrained by this requirement and plays its unconstrained optimal strategy ∗
1 = ∗2.
If preventing substitution R&D is too costly, country O may, alternatively, adjust to
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 is the rst period’s optimal supply conditional on conceding to 1 = . One
can check that ∗
 ∈ (0∗) holds in all cases.12
In sum, country O sets rst-period supply either to (20), preventing substitution R&D or
it sets (21), adjusting to substitution R&D. The equilibrium depends on the respective
utilities under both strategies. To evaluate this trade-oﬀ, it is convenient to dene total












Clearly, if country O concedes to W’s R&D it obtains total utility  ∗ (∗
∗ − ∗
)
while preventing R&D renders  ∗(min{∗ − ∗
∗2}max{∗
∗2}0). The equi-
librium strategy can be read from the sign of the diﬀerence of both expressions. The
following proposition shows that the optimal decision rule - and hence the equilibrium
strategy - depends in a simple way on total reserves ∗.
Proposition 1 ∃ 0 ∈ [∗
2∗
] so that under full information a subgame perfect Nash





) if ∗  0
(∗ − ∗
0) if ∗  0
(23)
Proof. Use (22) to dene ∆ ∗(∗) ≡  ∗(∗ − ∗
∗
0) −  ∗(∗
∗ − ∗
). It is
suﬃcient to show (i) ∆ ∗(∗
)  0, (ii) ∆ ∗(2∗
)  0, and (iii) ∗ − ∗
  ∗
 implies
∆ ∗(∗)∗  0 (∗ − ∗
  ∗
 implies 2 = 0 in any case).
12Note also that the expression in the rst line falls short of 
∗2 since under condition (16)  + 14
exceeds the value of the square root. For 
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Figure 3: Country O’s optimal quantities under full information.
(i) observe that
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1 is concave in ∗
1 by (14) this expression is positive whenever ∗ − ∗
  ∗
.
The intuition of the proposition is straight forward: country O’s two goals are, on the
one hand, to smooth supply according to the unconstrained rule (15) and, on the other,
to discourage country W from investing in the substitution technology. Since a minimum
supply in the second period (∗
2) is necessary to reach the second goal, the deviation
from the optimal unconstrained path (15) - and the associated utility loss - is relatively
large whenever the total reserves ∗ are low. Thus, the utility losses dominate the gains
from preventing investment if and only if ∗ falls short of a threshold 0. In this case,
country O adjusts to 1 = .
Figure 3 illustrates country O’s optimal supply ∗
1 (solid line) and ∗
2 (dashed line) as
13
functions of ∗. There are four diﬀerent ranges of ∗. First, for ∗  ∗
 country O
is not able to prevent country W’s investment and country W plays 1 = . Second,
under ∗ ∈ [∗
0] country O could possibly prevent W’s investment but optimally
chooses not to do so. Third, for ∗ ∈ [02∗
] country O optimally prevents country
W’s investment under the binding constraint (17). The slope of ∗
1(∗) is one in this range.
Finally, if ∗  2∗
, country O’s optimal strategy is not constrained. As a reference,
Figure 3 includes the unconstrained optimum i.e., the equal allocation over both periods,
∗
1 = ∗
2 = ∗2, as a dotted line. Deviations from this strategy reect either country O’s
need to react to W’s substitution capacity (2 = ) or, alternatively, its aim to prevent
country W’s investment. At 0 where country O is indiﬀerent between preventing and
conceding, ∗
1 jumps down since
 ∗(0 − ∗
∗
0) =  ∗(∗
0 − ∗
)   ∗(∗
0 − ∗
0)
implies 0 − ∗
  ∗
. Apart from this discontinuity, supply in both periods is (weakly)
increasing in ∗.
Before closing this section it is worth contemplating the distortion of supply under preven-
tion of country W’s R&D. If country O chooses to prevent W’s investment, world supply
of  is distorted away from the optimal rule (∗
1 = ∗
2) towards a more back-loaded
supply (∗
1  ∗
2). This nding is reminiscent of earlier work on natural resource extrac-
tion and market structure: Hotelling (1931) writes of a "retardation of production under
monopoly" and Quyen (1988) conrms that "the monopolist is excessively conservation-
ist." These studies predict that the monopolist scaries supply in early periods, which
creates a front-loaded stream of prots and a possibly longer duration of supply period.13
The mechanism presented here, instead, is qualitatively diﬀerent. Supply is partly delayed
in order to generate abundant future supply and thus discourage country W’s substitu-
tion R&D. The causality between future supply, incentives to engage in time-consuming
R&D, and optimal supply has a clear orientation on the time-line and suggests that this
deviation from the Hotelling rule is quite robust.
Proposition 1 has provided a description of the full information equilibrium. The next
section analyzes the incentives to misreport under asymmetric information of reserves.
4 Asymmetric Information
This section formalizes country O’s incentives to misreport the reserves of the natural
resource . The suitable framework for this analysis is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in
a signaling game.
13Stiglitz (1976) shows that these results do not stand up to robustness checks.
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1416 17
Within this framework, a player with private information can be said to actively deceive
other players if he conceals his type and benets from doing so. Applying this concept to
the current model, one of country O’s types will be said to misreport successfully if its
signal is not informative about remaining reserves and if, in addition, this specic type
enjoys higher utility in the resulting pooling equilibrium than under full information. By
denition, successful misreporting and benecial pooling are the same thing.14
With this denition I turn to the formal equilibrium concept next.
4.1 Equilibrium - Denition
The relevant actions of the signaling game are the following (compare Figure 2). In the
rst stage Nature decides on the realization of ∗ according to (1); country O observes
the realization of ∗ but country W does not. The realization of ∗ denes two diﬀerent
types of country O indexed by  =  and labeled country O in the case ∗ = ¯ 
and country O if ∗ =  ¯ . In the second stage country O signals its type with the
rst period’s supply ˜ 1. (The tilde indicates all possible levels of supply, including those
oﬀ-equilibrium.) In the third stage country W rationally updates its beliefs and chooses






are said to be part of a Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SPBE) if they satisfy the
following criteria
E(i) given W’s strategies, 
1 maximize O’s total utility for  = .
E(ii) given O’s strategies, W updates its believes using Bayes’ rule
E(iii) 
1(˜ 1) maximizes W’s expected total utility under the updated beliefs.
Country W’s beliefs are denoted by the function () : [0 ¯ ] → [01], which represents
country W’s subjective probabilities that country O is of high type conditional on observ-
ing supply 
1 or
(˜ 1) ≡ P(∗ = ¯  | ∗
1 = 
1)







∈ [0 ¯ ] × [0 ¯ ] and 
1 (˜ 1) : [0 ¯ ] → {0}
14Obviously, any costless reporting is discounted as cheap talk and entirely irrelevant to the model.
Acknowledging the fact that countries do report their reserves, however, this denition captures the "real"
side of the misreporting process and is therefore a natural one.
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Country W’s equilibrium technology in the second period is 
2 ∈ {0}, where  = .




For further references, it is useful to denote country O’s full information equilibrium
strategies (23) of type  =  as
∗
1 ∈ [0 ¯ ] and ∗
1(˜ 1) : [0 ¯ ] → {0}
∗
1 ∈ [0 ¯ ] and ∗
1(˜ 1) : [0 ¯ ] → {0}
Similarly, the variable ∗
2 ∈ {0} stands for country W’s substitution technology in the
second period of the full information equilibrium, given country O’s type .
The existence and the characteristics of the signaling game’s equilibrium is sensitive to the
specication of the receiver’s beliefs, including the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. The minimal
requirement that the updating of beliefs follow Bayes’ rule leaves a wide range of oﬀ-
equilibrium beliefs that generally sustain a large number of equilibria. The equilibria will











1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2)   ∗(∗




A(iv) ˜ 1 ∈ [0 ¯ ] ˜  outcome of W’s optimal 
1(˜ 1) under (˜ 1) = .
 ∗(˜ 1 ¯  − ˜ 1˜ )   ∗(
1 ¯  − 
1
2)
 ∗(˜ 1 ¯  − ˜ 1˜ )   ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2)
⇒ (˜ 1) = .
A(v) ˜ 1 ∈ [0 ¯ ] ˜  outcome of W’s optimal 
1(˜ 1) under (˜ 1) = .
 ∗(˜ 1 ¯  − ˜ 1˜ )   ∗(
1 ¯  − 
1
2)
 ∗(˜ 1 ¯  − ˜ 1˜ )   ∗(
1 ¯  − 
1
2)
⇒ (˜ 1) = 0.
Assumptions A(i) and A(ii) simply formulate the requirement of Bayesian updating. A(iii)
requires that, if O does not gain from imitation of O’s full information strategy (∗
1)
relative to its own full information strategy (∗
1), then W, when observing ∗
1, believes
in  =  with certainty. This assumption implies that O plays its full information
strategy whenever it does not pay for O to pool to ∗
1. A(iii) thereby establishes the
full information equilibrium as the default outcome.16 Conversely, this implies that a
pooling equilibrium only exists if no separating equilibrium exists, which includes the full
15Renements A(iii) - A(v) are remniscent of the of the Intuitive Criterion in Cho and Kreps (1987).
16This statement follows from two observations: First, 
∗
1 is O’s unique optimal strategy under full
information. Second, asymmetric information adds one more constraint to O’s optimization program
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1 is O’s unique optimal strategy under full
information. Second, asymmetric information adds one more constraint to O’s optimization program
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information strategies. — A(iv) requires that, if O gains from a deviation to ˜ 1 relative
to an equilibrium outcome 
1 provided that (˜ 1) =  and if, further, O prefers to
pool to that deviation ˜ 1 rather than to resort to its full information equilibrium, then
W, when actually observing strategy ˜ 1, is agnostic about O’s type and sticks to its prior
beliefs ((˜ 1) = ). This assumption eliminates all equilibria that render the high type
less utility than the pooling equilibrium with maximal utility for the high type. — Finally,
A(v) requires that, whenever O looses from a deviation to ˜ 1 relative to the equilibrium
provided that (˜ 1) =  while O gains from a deviation to ˜  relative to its current
equilibrium outcome provided that (˜ 1) = , then W, when observing strategy ˜ 1,
believes in  =  with certainty ((˜ 1) = 0). This assumption ties O to the equilibrium
strategy that is benecial for O.
4.2 Equilibrium - Characterization
TO characterize the equilibria under asymmetric information, consider rst country W’s
choice. Compared with the full information, country W’s situation changes to the extent
that, at the time of making the R&D decision it may face subjective uncertainty about
the second period’s supply of the natural resource. Consequently, its optimal strategy is
now taken on the basis of the expected returns to substitution R&D, where expectations
are formed using subjective probabilities. More precisely, country W’s strategy is based
on a probabilistic analog of inequality (17), which, when using the denition of , can be
written as
ln() + 1
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2() stands for the optimal export tax (10) under 2 = 0. Condition (24) deter-
mines country W’s investment behavior and17
1(˜ 1) =
(
0 if (24) holds
 else
(25)
Country O’s optimal strategy does not follow such a handy rule. As in the case of full
information, country O gains from depressing the investment in substitution R&D but
(the incentive compatibility constraint in the case of a separating and the probabilistic equivalent of (17)
with prior probabilities  and 1− in the case of a pooling equilibrium — see (24)) so that in all equilibria of
the signaling game O obtains weakly less utility than in the full information equilibrium. Thus, whenever













1) = 0 (Proposition 1 grants that O actually does so).
17This seemingly simple decision rule involves the updated beliefs , must satisfy A(i) - A(v) and hence



















Figure 4: Boundaries of O’s net benets from preventing W’s R&D.
loses from deviations of its optimal supply rules. When engaging in signaling, country
O aims to prevent country W’s substitution R&D at the cost of distorted supply. This
trade-oﬀ between country O’s costs and benets of the signal is central to the computation
of the equilibrium. It will prove useful to dene the limits on the rst period’s supply ˜ 1
which, disregarding information asymmetries, set the bounds of country O’s willingness to
discourage substitution R&D. Such thresholds must leave country O indiﬀerent between
successfully inducing 1 = 0 and conceding to 1 = . Using (22), a lower bound  is
implicitly dened by   ∗2 and
 ∗(∗
∗ − ∗
) −  ∗(∗ − 0) = 0 (26)
By this denition,  depends on total reserves ∗ and some of its properties can be
inferred from (26).
Claim 1  satises the following properties.
(i)  is well dened and unique for ∗ ∈ [02∗
].
(ii)   ∗ − ∗
 if and only if ∗ ∈ (02∗
].
(iii) ∗2 −   |∗2 − ∗
|.
(iv) 0  
∗  1.
(v)  is positive on ∗ ∈ (02∗
].
Proof. See appendix.
By Claim 1 (i), the threshold  is a function of ∗ and can be written as (∗).
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Proof. See appendix.
By Claim 1 (i), the threshold  is a function of ∗ and can be written as (∗).
Concavity of ∗|2=0 (see (14)) and   ∗2 implies that the value (∗) constitutes
1820 21
a lower bound on the quantities which country O, endowed with ∗, is willing to supply
in the rst period to prevent country W from engaging in substitution R&D. Finally, the
symmetry of  ∗(∗
1∗
20) in the rst two arguments implies that the function
(∗) ≡ ∗ − (∗) (27)
establishes the corresponding upper bound on the quantities ∗
1. Figure 4 illustrates these
bounds (∗) and (∗) as dashed lines, the solid line represents the equilibrium ∗
1
under full information. By Claim 1 (iv) and (v), the functions (∗) and (∗) are
increasing in ∗, lie within the interval (0∗), and satisfy (∗)  ∗2  (∗).
Country O, endowed with ∗, is willing to supply any ∗
1 ∈ [(∗)(∗)] in the rst
period if this prevents substitution R&D in country W (i.e., induces 1 = 0). Notice that,
since country O optimally concedes to 1 =  for ∗  0, the threshold (∗) lies
above the line ∗−∗
 in this range, i.e., ∗  0 implies (∗)  ∗−∗
. Conversely,
for ∗  0 country O optimally prevents investment in R&D, hence (∗)  ∗ −∗

in this range. The functions (∗) and ∗ − ∗
 intersect at the value ∗ = 0 where
country O is indiﬀerent between conceding to 1 =  and preventing it.
With the denitions of  and  and the properties summarized in Claim 1 it is possible
to give a rst irrelevance result and to formulate specic conditions for the realizations  ¯ 
and ¯  under which the information asymmetries do not impact the real world economy
at all. These conditions are spelled out in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that at least one of the following conditions holds
(i) ¯  6∈ [02∗
]
(ii) ( ¯ )  ¯  − ∗

then the SPBE in pure strategies is unique and characterized by the full information strate-
gies (23). In particular, the SPBE is a separating equilibrium.
Proof. Observe rst that A(iii) implies that O plays its full information strategy ∗
1
whenever it does not pay for O to pool to ∗
1, i.e. when
 ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2)   ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2) (28)
holds. This statement follows from two basic observations. First, ∗
1 is O’s unique
optimal strategy under full information. Second, O obtains weakly less utility in an
equilibrium of the signaling game than under full information, because asymmetric infor-
mation adds one constraint to O’s optimization program (the incentive compatibility
constraint in the case of a separating and (24) in the case of a pooling equilibrium). Now,
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whenever (28) holds A(iii) grants that O obtains its maximum (full information) utility
by playing 
1 = ∗
1. It is thus suﬃcient to show (28).
Assume now that (i) holds. If ¯   0 W plays 1 =  in the full information equilibria
under ∗ = ¯ . In this case
 ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
10)   ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
10)
by optimality of ∗
1 under full information.
If, instead, ¯   2∗
, (20) implies that O’s full information strategy is ∗
1 = ¯ 2.
Distinguish now two cases: rst, under  ¯   2∗
 then (28) holds since
 ∗( ¯ 2 ¯  − ¯ 20)   ∗( ¯ 2 ¯ 20) =  ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2)
Second, under  ¯   2∗
 one has
 ∗( ¯ 2 ¯  − ¯ 20) =  ∗( ¯  − ¯ 2 ¯ 20)
  ∗( ¯  − ∗
∗
0) ≤  ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2)
where the rst line employs symmetry of  ∗(0), the strict inequality follows from (14)
together with symmetry of  ∗(0) and the weak inequality from follows from (23).
Assume next that (i) is violated so that ∗
1 = ¯  − ∗
 but (ii) holds. These conditions
and the denition of  (27) imply ( ¯ )   ¯  − ( ¯  − ∗
)   ¯  − ∗
 and hence
∗
2 = . Thus, by construction of  and 
 ∗( ¯  − ∗
 ¯  − ( ¯  − ∗
)0)   ∗(( ¯ ) ¯  − ( ¯ )0)
=  ∗(( ¯ ) ¯  − ( ¯ )0)
≤  ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
1)
holds. This proves the statement.
The rst part of the proposition, related to condition (i), reects that for very large ¯ ,
the low type’s pooling strategy is more costly than inducing 1 = 0 directly, i.e., under
revelation of its type. Similarly, for small ¯  ( ¯   0) even the high type optimally
concedes to 1 =  and there is no gain for O that compensates for the cost of pooling.
Figure 5 illustrates the result of Proposition 2 related to condition (ii). Whenever  ¯  is
small and lies below the value −1( ¯  − ∗
), the gure shows that the high type’s full
information strategy ¯  −∗
 lies outside the interval [( ¯ )(( ¯ ))], which comprises
all signals O is willing to set in order to induce 1 = 0. Consequently, it can be ruled
out that the low type pools to the strategy ¯  − ∗
, since this would render strictly less
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by playing 
1 = ∗
1. It is thus suﬃcient to show (28).
Assume now that (i) holds. If ¯   0 W plays 1 =  in the full information equilibria
under ∗ = ¯ . In this case
 ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
10)   ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
10)
by optimality of ∗
1 under full information.
If, instead, ¯   2∗
, (20) implies that O’s full information strategy is ∗
1 = ¯ 2.
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1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2)
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∗
0) ≤  ∗(∗
1 ¯  − ∗
1∗
2)
where the rst line employs symmetry of  ∗(0), the strict inequality follows from (14)
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∗
2 = . Thus, by construction of  and 
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 ¯  − ( ¯  − ∗
)0)   ∗(( ¯ ) ¯  − ( ¯ )0)
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1 ¯  − ∗
1)
holds. This proves the statement.
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), the gure shows that the high type’s full
information strategy ¯  −∗
 lies outside the interval [( ¯ )(( ¯ ))], which comprises
all signals O is willing to set in order to induce 1 = 0. Consequently, it can be ruled
out that the low type pools to the strategy ¯  − ∗
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Figure 5: O’s incentives to imitate O and equilibrium signals.
utility than her full information strategy. Thus, under any of these conditions, the two
types resort to the respective full information strategies.
Having excluded the existence of pooling equilibria for some parameter range, the attention
rests on the remaining parameter range. Thus, rest of the section will focus on the cases
where conditions
¯  ∈ (02∗
) (29)
and
 ∈ [−1( ¯  − ∗
) ¯ 1) (30)
are satised. Conditions (29) and (30) assure that type O gains from imitating O’s
full information strategy ∗
1 if that discourages substitution R&D. Under such pooling
attempts, however, country W adapts its beliefs so that the full information strategy ∗
1
cannot be part of a pooling equilibrium. Instead, the natural candidate for the signal of
a pooling equilibrium is the quantity that solves (24) with equality under prior beliefs
 ≡ . Let this value be denoted by 


































2() stands for the second period’s export tax (10) under 2 = 0. One quickly
veries that the expression on the left of (31) is decreasing in export taxes and, hence, by
(10), is increasing in 
. Equation (10) implies further that the term in the rst slanted
brackets is larger than the term in the second slanted brackets and, therefore, the whole
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expression on the left of (31) is decreasing in . Finally, the expression on the left on (31)
is decreasing in . These observations, together with the implicit function theorem, imply
that the threshold 
 is increasing in  and . Notice also that at  = 1 condition (31)
coincides with (17) in which case 
 = ¯ −∗
 while at  = 0 (31) leads to 



















 =  ¯  − ∗
 (35)
The diﬀerence 
 −( ¯  −∗
)  0 between 
 and O’s full information strategy reects
that country W reacts to O’s incentives to pool, by revising expected future supply of 
downward relative to the full information equilibrium under ∗ = ¯ . To compensate for
this drop of expected future supply, O must further increase the second period supply
if she wants to discourage country W’s R&D. Hence 
  ¯  − ∗
 holds.
In addition to country W, type O also reacts to O’s pooling attempts, and may indeed
choose not to discourage substitution R&D. In this case, O’s incentives to pool cease to
exist. This introduces an additional condition to be satised in a pooling equilibrium: the
relevant signal 
 must be element of the set [( ¯ )( ¯ )]. Since conditions (33) and
(34) imply 
  ¯  − ∗
 and since ¯  − ∗
  ¯ 2 by (29), the relevant constraint is

 ≥ ( ¯ ) (36)
Now remember that 
 is a function of  and  so that condition (36) implicitly denes
a constraint on the parameters  and . In particular, the equation 
 = ( ¯ ) denes
a schedule on the ()-plane which, by virtue of properties (32) and (33), represents a
decreasing function () that limits the region within which a pooling equilibrium may
exist. For values of  (), condition (36) is violated and type O does not induce
1 = 0 but optimally concedes to 1 = , in which case O lacks incentives to imitate
O.
These observations suggest that — in addition to the necessary conditions (29) and (30)
— the requirement (36) is necessary for a pooling equilibrium to exists. The following
proposition identies conditions (29), (30), and (36) as jointly suﬃcient, granting that the
two-stage signaling game has a pooling equilibrium in pure strategies, which is — modulo
country W’s oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs  and strategies — unique.
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Figure 6: Three diﬀerent types of equilibria.
Proposition 3 If (29), (30), and (36) hold, a SPBE in pure strategies exists. Moreover,









1) = 0 (37)
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 6 illustrates the two key conditions (30) and (36) that delimit the range for the
parameters  and  where pooling equilibria prevail. Condition (30) sets a minimum that
 needs to exceed, represented by the dashed vertical line in the gure. Condition (36)
denes a minimum () that the ex ante probability  must exceed to grant (36). The
function () is marked as a bold line. Both conditions are satised for parameters within
the area A. Notice with (33) and (35) that for  
£
( ¯ ) + ∗

¤
 ¯  , the value 
 exceeds
( ¯ ) for any probability  ∈ [01], in which case the requirements on  are empty and
hence the bold line hits the -axis at the value
£




To the left of the dashed line, in area B, condition (30) is violated. Hence Proposition




1) for  = , respectively).
Finally, if (30) holds but (36) is violated (area C in Figure 6), type O optimally chooses
not to induce 1 = 0 under O’s pooling attempts. Consequently, O lacks incentives
to pool. While a formal proof is omitted here, the equilibrium strategies can be shown
to follow the supply rules (21) for ∗ =  ¯  ¯ , respectively: a separating equilibrium
prevails, with O deviating from its full information strategies.
18For ¯  & 0 it is quick to check that this value falls short of one.
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One important feature of the pooling equilibria characterized in Proposition 3 remains
to be highlighted. This feature concerns the cost of signaling. Observe that the signal,
which the low type must incur in order to imitate the high type is restricted to lie on
the grey vertical line in Figure 5. For the adequate size of low reserves ( ¯ ) this implies
that the signal of the pooling equilibrium (
) lies strictly closer to the unconstrained
optimal supply ( ¯ 2) of the low type, thus generating additional benets. Formally, this
property can be stated as follows.
Corollary to Proposition 3. If 2 ∈ (( ¯ ) ¯ (1 − ∗
 ¯ )) there are 12 with
()  1  2  1 so that for all  ∈ [12]
 ≡ ∗(∗
)|1=0 − ∗(
)|1=0  0 (38)
holds. The set (( ¯ ) ¯ (1 − ∗
 ¯ )) is non-empty for ¯  − ∗
  ( ¯ ) for ¯   0.
Proof. At  = 1 
 = ¯  − ∗
 holds, implying 
   ¯ 2 by assumption; at  =()

 = ( ¯ )   ¯ 2. Since 
 is increasing and continuous in  there is a 0 so that

 =  ¯ 2. Again, by continuity of 
() there are 12 with the stated properties so
that
¯ ¯ ¯ 2 − 

¯ ¯ 
¯ ¯ ¯ 2 − ∗

¯ ¯ for  ∈ [12]. This proves the claim.
To what extent does the Corollary relate to the cost of signaling? Quite generally in
signaling games, one of the informed types receives information rents by making the
uninformed player choose a strategy that benets the informed type compared to its full
information payoﬀs. Obviously, when separating the cost from the benet of the signal,
the cost must be dened by holding constant the induced benet. In this sense, the cost
of signaling can be dened as the change in the informed type’s payoﬀs that the necessary
signal generates, conditional on inducing the (desired) asymmetric information strategy of
the uninformed player. The change is measured relative to the natural benchmark, i.e.,
relative to the full information strategy. Applying this denition to the present setting,
the cost that the low type O incurs by setting the signal is captured by the expression
 in equation (38).
When read in this way, the corollary presents a striking insight of the model. It shows
that, for a wide parameter range, the cost of signaling is actually negative for the low
overreporting type O. Put diﬀerently, the overreporting supplier gains not only from
preventing W’s substitution R&D but also form the very fact of signaling itself.
This fact is somewhat surprising. One could reasonably expect that this cost is propor-
tional to the degree by which reserves are actually overstated — so that "bigger lies bear
bigger costs". This guess proves wrong. Instead, an overreporting exporter may actually
gain not only from the implication of overreporting but also from signaling (or "lying")
itself. Thus, the general principle, according to which the low type trades oﬀ the gains
from pooling against the cost of the signal, does not apply in the present model.
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relative to the full information strategy. Applying this denition to the present setting,
the cost that the low type O incurs by setting the signal is captured by the expression
 in equation (38).
When read in this way, the corollary presents a striking insight of the model. It shows
that, for a wide parameter range, the cost of signaling is actually negative for the low
overreporting type O. Put diﬀerently, the overreporting supplier gains not only from
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gain not only from the implication of overreporting but also from signaling (or "lying")
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The fundamental reason for this result is the following. The high type, O, who loses from
pooling vis-a-vis separation, would like to signal her high reserves. Since high reserves
come along with high supply the obvious way to signal would seem to increase the rst
period’s supply. But this is not viable signal, since the preventing R&D precisely requires
a minimum supply in the second period. Any increase in the rst period’s supply would
thus reduce the remaining reserves, decrease the second period’s (expected) supply and
hence trigger country W’s R&D. The natural way to signal high reserves is barred by the
incentive compatibility constraint (24).
Consequently, the costs of signaling do not impost a clear quantitative restriction on the
existence of pooling equilibria.
4.3 Pooling Equilibrium - Discussion
By the earlier denition type O is said to misreport its reserves if its equilibrium action
∗
1 does not reveal its type and its utility in the resulting pooling equilibrium is higher
than in the respective full information equilibrium.
Applying this denition and observing that, relative to the full information outcome, the
low type benets from pooling (granted by condition (30)), the low type O is said to
overreport its reserves in all equilibria characterized in Proposition 3. Conversely, the
high type looses in all pooling equilibria (check that conditions (29), (33) and (34) imply

  ¯  − ∗
  ¯ 2 and apply (14)). The analysis thus shows that, under the stated
conditions, oil suppliers have incentives to over- but not to underreport.
Without formally extending the model, the next paragraphs will discuss the conditions of
the main results as well as the modelling framework under which they have been derived.
The Pooling Equilibrium. The conditions for credible overreporting (Proposition 3)
can be summarized by two simple and intuitive requirements. First, the lower bound of
condition (29) requires that, under full information, the high type prevents country W’s
R&D activity. If this condition is violated, substitution R&D took place irrespective of
the realization ∗ and the goal to prevent substitution R&D could not be realized by
overreporting — rendering overreporting useless. Second, the costs arising from the signal
must be limited for both players: the upper bound of (29) and condition (30) imply that
the low type’s costs of overreporting do not exceed the gains. Similarly, if the high type’s
distortions from the pooling equilibrium are too costly (condition (36) is violated) then
the pooling equilibrium ceases to exist since, in that case, the high type concedes to R&D
activity. If any of these conditions is violated, the necessary signal introduces excessive
distortions of supply and is too costly.
Finally, underreporting does not occur. This observation raises the question why, in the
current model, anticipated future oil shortages do not raise current prices, thereby mo-
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tivating oil suppliers to underreport. This result is due to the fact that storage cost are
assumed to be prohibitive: it is well known that the marginal cost of storage reects
the inter-temporal price spread (see, e.g., Working (1949)) as long as demand for storage
is positive. Prohibitive storage costs, in turn, decuple inter-temporal markets and mar-
ket prices, thus eliminating incentives to misreport. In this sense, the model’s setup is
loaded in favor of overreporting. I do not, however, apologize for this bias. Including
these incentives to underreport would add a simple mechanism at the considerable cost of
further complication. The present paper, instead, focusses on modelling the less intuitive
incentives to overreport.
Modelling framework. The analysis above relies on a set of assumptions that made
the model tractable but require a brief discussion.
First, good  is supplied monopolistically. This assumption is crucial since it enables the
exporter of good  to control the intertemporal distribution of aggregate reserves and
thereby manipulate the importer’s substitution R&D. The assumption can be read as a
simplication for non-competitive supply in general, as in Pindyck (1978). Extensions to
oligopolistic supply, however, should be possible. Thus, in the (natural) case of competi-
tion through quantities, the incentives for suppliers to prevent R&D and overreport are
reduced but do not vanish, since oligopolists still partially internalize the incentives that
operate on the industry-level.
Second, substitution R&D is a binary choice.19 This is a convenient simplication but
not a crucial assumption. A natural generalization would introduce the productivity 
of the substitution technology in (4) as a continuous function of total R&D expenditure
1 ∈ R+. Intuitively, under full information, the equilibrium (1) is then a decreasing
function of the second period’s supply ∗
2 and of total reserves ∗. Hence, the scenario
preserves country O’s incentives to overreport in order to discourage marginal substitution
eﬀorts and reduce the intensity of foreign competition in period two. Also, in a pooling
equilibrium the signal may still be arbitrarily close to the low type’s rst best supply
∗
 =  ¯ 2, rendering negative signaling cost for the low type.
Third, there is only one importer of good . Country W’s gains from substitution R&D
accrue via reductions in export taxes while domestic production is zero for a wide parame-
ter range.20 Consequently, no private enterprise can recoup the investment 1 = , which
must therefore be nanced publicly. Whenever many small countries import , free-riding
eﬀects among these -importers arise regarding R&D expenditures, thus harming the pa-
per’s mechanism. One may, however, conjecture that the paper’s logic remains intact in a
world where substitution technologies, once invented, deliver a ow of good  (as in the
19This assumption follows Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Deshmukh and Pliska (1983), Quyen (1988), and
Barrett (2006).
20The range for 
∗ is (3+
√
−40) under full information (see the proof of (21) in the Appendix).
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the inter-temporal price spread (see, e.g., Working (1949)) as long as demand for storage
is positive. Prohibitive storage costs, in turn, decuple inter-temporal markets and mar-
ket prices, thus eliminating incentives to misreport. In this sense, the model’s setup is
loaded in favor of overreporting. I do not, however, apologize for this bias. Including
these incentives to underreport would add a simple mechanism at the considerable cost of
further complication. The present paper, instead, focusses on modelling the less intuitive
incentives to overreport.
Modelling framework. The analysis above relies on a set of assumptions that made
the model tractable but require a brief discussion.
First, good  is supplied monopolistically. This assumption is crucial since it enables the
exporter of good  to control the intertemporal distribution of aggregate reserves and
thereby manipulate the importer’s substitution R&D. The assumption can be read as a
simplication for non-competitive supply in general, as in Pindyck (1978). Extensions to
oligopolistic supply, however, should be possible. Thus, in the (natural) case of competi-
tion through quantities, the incentives for suppliers to prevent R&D and overreport are
reduced but do not vanish, since oligopolists still partially internalize the incentives that
operate on the industry-level.
Second, substitution R&D is a binary choice.19 This is a convenient simplication but
not a crucial assumption. A natural generalization would introduce the productivity 
of the substitution technology in (4) as a continuous function of total R&D expenditure
1 ∈ R+. Intuitively, under full information, the equilibrium (1) is then a decreasing
function of the second period’s supply ∗
2 and of total reserves ∗. Hence, the scenario
preserves country O’s incentives to overreport in order to discourage marginal substitution
eﬀorts and reduce the intensity of foreign competition in period two. Also, in a pooling
equilibrium the signal may still be arbitrarily close to the low type’s rst best supply
∗
 =  ¯ 2, rendering negative signaling cost for the low type.
Third, there is only one importer of good . Country W’s gains from substitution R&D
accrue via reductions in export taxes while domestic production is zero for a wide parame-
ter range.20 Consequently, no private enterprise can recoup the investment 1 = , which
must therefore be nanced publicly. Whenever many small countries import , free-riding
eﬀects among these -importers arise regarding R&D expenditures, thus harming the pa-
per’s mechanism. One may, however, conjecture that the paper’s logic remains intact in a
world where substitution technologies, once invented, deliver a ow of good  (as in the
19This assumption follows Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Deshmukh and Pliska (1983), Quyen (1988), and
Barrett (2006).
20The range for 
∗ is (3+
√
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case of some renewable energies) or, in another scenario, where consumers choose between
alternative durable equipment that aﬀect future aggregate demand for . In such cases,
the returns to substitution R&D are appropriable and mitigate the free-riding problem.21
The paper’s key insight can be expected to carry over to such scenarios.
Fourth, there is no aggregate uncertainty about resources and outcomes of R&D. Under
such additional uncertainty, the trade-oﬀ between country W’s cost and benets of substi-
tution R&D and country O’s prevention of R&D is based on expected utilities (aﬀecting
conditions (17), (22), and (24)). It appears unlikely that this change can overturn the
qualitative results.
Fifth, oil is traded between two countries — instead of a generic prot-maximizing seller and
a generic buyer. Adopting this standard framework instead would neglect the oil exporter’s
utility losses that arise from by her own signaling and the accompanying distortions of
global oil supply.22 Abstracting from these costs of overreport would bias the model —
and load it to generate pooling equilibria.
Finally, the oil-exporter levies export taxes ∗
 . This additional policy tool tends to
complicate the analysis. For a justication of this complication, recall that country W’s
benet from R&D accrue mainly through a reduction of country O’s market power in
the oil-market at  = 2 (see also the discussion following equation (16)). A comprehen-
sive analysis must therefore involve the prime tool through which country O exercises
its market power in the foreign market. This tool is traditionally quantity control or,
equivalently, export taxes.23 More importantly, in absence of a meaningful tool to extract
monopoly rents, it is a priori unclear which of the two types, O or O, loses more from
country W’s R&D and which of them, therefore, rather decides to prevent this R&D.
With this question unanswered, an analysis that tries to assess which type imitates whom
must necessarily remain shaky.
4.4 The Crude Oil Market
Motivated by rising concerns about energy security, this paper has developed a model
to address the questions why, how, and under what conditions crude oil reserves may be
overreported. It has shown that exporting countries indeed have motives to overreport
and that they can credibly do so under rational expectations. The minimal conditions for
overreporting are intuitive: substitution R&D must respond signicantly to expected
21Part of the free-riding problem remains as non-investing agents gain from reduced prices of the con-
ventional resource due to a drop in demand.
22Consumers’ optimality condidtions imply (
∗
 + 1)( + 1) = 
∗
 . This condition, together with
(10) and market clearing (
∗
 +  = ¯ ) determines consumption 
(∗)
. It is quick to check that under

∗




1 = ¯ 1 = 
∗−






only in knife-edge cases. Hence there are real losses from overreporting.
23Export taxes are also equivalent to import tariﬀs (see Helpman and Krugman (1989)).
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future supply and supply itself needs to be non-competitive. This subsection briey
addresses the remaining of the initial questions: Can overreporting be refuted for today’s
oil market?
To answer this question the two key assumptions of the model are to be checked: a strong
reaction of substitution R&D to expected future supply and supply needs to be non-
competitive. Concerning the rst condition, evidence suggests that substitution R&D
indeed responds to shortages of the market. Figure 1 illustrates that non-oil energy
R&D in IEA member countries and world oil prices comove in the period 1973-2006.
In addition, current prices strongly correlate with price forecasts in the relevant period
(see Lynch (2002) and IMF (2003)). Together, these observations imply a comovement
between expected future supply and R&D activity. Of course, raw correlations do not
imply causality. Yet, empirical studies show that energy saving R&D is indeed responsive
to supply shortages (see Newell et al (1999) and Popp (2002)) so that the rst of the
necessary conditions seems to be satised. The second requirement of non-competitive
oil markets may appear obvious. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, empirical
literature is inconclusive about OPEC’s actual market power. Some quantitative studies
indicate that in the years following the counter-oil shock in 1986, OPEC countries failed
to behave as a cartel and over-supplied the world market instead of under-supplying
it (Almoguera and Herrera (2007) and Lin (2007)). Yet, other empirical studies such as
Griﬃn (1985) and Smith (2003), report strong coordination and cartel discipline of OPEC
members and a signicant shortage of contemporaneous supply. If the latter studies are
to be believed, the present paper’s two fundamental assumptions do hold.
Finally, Proposition 3 requires that the cost of the signal be limited. A thorough quantita-
tive assessment of the likelihood of overreporting must clearly involve these costs. Within
a rst qualitative application of the theory, however, this requirement does not serve as
a meaningful criterion since, by the Corollary to Proposition 3, there is no positive lower
bound on the cost of signaling.
In sum, the possibility of overreporting in today’s oil market cannot be easily refuted
by applying the present paper’s predictions qualitatively. Thus, the last — and to the
policymaker the most relevant — of the initial questions remains unanswered.24 This
observation calls for a thorough quantitative research of the issue, which may at the same
time answer the question whether the interpretation of OPEC as a cartel of supply is to
be extended to a cartel of information.
24Recall that credible overreporting can be refuted, while it cannot be proven before private information
is revealed. Under credible overreporting the probability that reserves are high ( from (1)) are positive.
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5 Conclusion
Concerns are rising about the supply security of crude oil. In addition to geological
and political risks, some experts point at overreporting as one — possibly signicant —
source of uncertainty, claiming that crude oil reserves are much lower than commonly
assumed. While many market experts disagree with the assertions of the "Peak Oilists,"
the economic consequences of potential supply disruptions could arguably be dire.
Motivated by these observations, the present paper has provided a simple but suggestive
model for the analysis of the exporters’ costs and incentives to overreport crude oil re-
serves. The key assumptions of the theory are, rst, market power of oil suppliers, second,
the possibility to engage in R&D to substitute oil, and third, private information about
remaining oil reserves. It has been shown that, within this framework, the one incentive
to overreport can be attributed to the aim of exporters to discourage importers’ R&D for
substitution technologies. Surprisingly, an exporter with low reserves can pretend to own
high reserves at negligible or even negative costs. Finally, conditional on the reported
realizations of reserves, supply is partly delayed under successful overreporting.
The standard discourse on security of crude oil supply involves a number of technical
and political aspects, among which overreporting ranks rather low. It is therefore appro-
priate to briey consider the broader picture, which the economics of natural resources
sketches. This general image is very comforting when uncertainties are absent: the con-
tinued exhaustion of a natural resource raises the returns to resource-saving substitution
technologies, which are eventually generated by intensifying research (see Davidson (1978),
Deshmukh and Pliska (1983) and Tsur and Zemel (2003)). In this process forward-looking
rms anticipate future prots and, motivated by consumer’s willingness to pay for steady
consumption ows, grant a smooth transition between a resource- and a substitution-based
regime. This picture, however, changes under uncertainty, when (information) shocks
cause ex-post ineﬃciencies. Since such eﬃciency losses typically grow with the degree of
uncertainty, the relevant issue is to identify the sources and magnitudes of uncertainties.
Traditionally, geological and political unknowns are considered as the major sources of
uncertainty. Today, advanced exploration technology allows quite accurate assessments
of the size of oil elds and tough surprises due to technological drawbacks are argued to
be unlikely (see e.g. Cuddington and Moss (2001)). Thus, man-made or on-the-ground
uncertainty appears to be the remaining source of uncertainty. Within that category,
political instability is usually focused on — in particular that arising from the geopolitical
situation in the Middle East (see, e.g., IEA (2005)). Yet, if alleged overreporting of about
a quarter of world crude oil reserves cannot be refuted, then the resulting supply shocks
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for  ∈ (0∗2). (Subscripts stand for partial derivatives.)
(i) Check with (22) that
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1 (∗ − 0) holds by (iii), this shows ∗  1.
(v) Follows from lim∗→0 ∆(∗0) = 0 and (iv).
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof consists of two parts: Part (i) shows that any belief
system  that satises (
) =  and A(iii) - A(v) sustains the strategies (37) as part
of the SPBE in pure strategies. This shows existence. Part (ii) shows that any SPBE in
pure strategies with  satisfying A(i) - A(v) includes the strategies (37).
Part (i). Check E(iii). The decision rule (25) grants W’s individual optimality and, by
construction of 
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Check E(ii). A(i) is void under (37) and (
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also that A(iii) is void since its condition does not hold by (29) and (30).
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holds so that O pools to O’s strategy 
1. By A(ii) this implies (
1) =  and (24)
is violated. This shows that 
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